CHEP: The Net of Things by Vitzthum, Sascha & Konsynski, Benn
Communications of the Association for Information Systems
Volume 22 Article 26
4-2008
CHEP: The Net of Things
Sascha Vitzthum
Goizueta Business School Emory University
Benn Konsynski
Emory University, benn_konsynski@bus.emory.ed
Follow this and additional works at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/cais
This material is brought to you by the AIS Journals at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in Communications of the
Association for Information Systems by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Vitzthum, Sascha and Konsynski, Benn (2008) "CHEP: The Net of Things," Communications of the Association for Information Systems:
Vol. 22 , Article 26.
DOI: 10.17705/1CAIS.02226
Available at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/cais/vol22/iss1/26
  
Volume 22 Article 26 
CHEP: The Net of Things  
Sascha Vitzthum 
 
Benn Konsynski 
 
Goizueta Business School Emory University 
sascha_vitzthum@bus.emory.edu 
 
PART A: Forced by operational inefficiencies in its own business model, CHEP, the market leader in the rental pallet 
business, became an early adopter of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology. Having proven the 
effectiveness of the technology for internal operations with a pilot test, CHEP now had to find clients who want to 
adopt the technology-enabled services in order to pay for a large scale roll out.  
 
The case traces CHEP’s challenges associated with the development and deployment RFID in its own operation 
and raises questions of how to proceed with potential IT-enabled change at the enterprise and supply chain level, 
without spoiling relationships with current clients and maintaining its core business. 
 
PART B: In fall 2007, Brian Beattie and Puneet Sawhney looked back at CHEP’s RFID initiative and the progress 
that has been made since the 2003 decision to further incorporate the technology into its assets. While the original 
intent of tagging all pallets did not materialize, considerable progress had been made into quantifying the benefits of 
RFID adoption. Industry-wide developments had changed the scope of the RFID initiative from simply tagging the 
asset pool to creating value added service for CHEP’s clients. Overall, RFID had yet to revolutionize the supply 
chain, but the evolution of technology and the innovation of RFID related products and services had aided CHEP in 
maintaining its market leadership in the pallet business and enabled CHEP to created new lines of business. 
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PART A: INTRODUCTION12 
In the early 2000s the major retail chains moved beyond the boundaries of the enterprise to further improve their 
operations. One particular focus of companies such as Wal-Mart, Tesco, and Metro was the optimization of the 
entire supply chain. While Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) had connected supply chains a decade earlier, the 
quality and accuracy of the information shared was by no means satisfactory. The emergence of Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID) provided the technology needed to capture accurate and timely item-level data, information that 
was deemed crucial to optimize the product and information flow throughout entire supply chain. 
 
CHEP, the leading provider of rental pallets in the U.S. was both an integral part of most major supply chain 
operations and an early adopter of RFID. Having invested more than $20 million in the research and development of 
RFID enabled pallets, the CHEP management was under increasing pressure by its parent company to monetize on 
its innovations beyond efficiency gains in its internal operations.  
 
By championing RFID, CHEP had put itself in the position to enable change on the enterprise, supply change and 
industry level. However, inducing technology enabled change while at the same time maintaining a profitable core 
business posed a unique challenge for CHEP. Unsure of how to best market the new technology to clients and 
partners, CHEP had to decide whether they just want to offer enhanced RFID pallets for its clients, or to become a 
supply chain wide information broker. 
I. INDUSTRY BACKGROUND 
A pallet is a platform, usually made of wood and assembled with metal nails. Typically, goods move in commerce 
from their manufacturer to distributors, to wholesalers, and finally to retailers, where they are made available for 
purchase by the consumer. Wooden pallets are used for purposes of hauling, loading and unloading, and storing the 
goods. The wooden pallet has traditionally been the basis for the design of storage racks, warehouse storage areas, 
forklifts, docks and containers used in shipping goods. It is estimated by industry sources that on average there are 
more than seven pallets for each person in the United States. According to a survey conducted by the National 
Wooden Pallet and Container Association, 91 percent of pallet users reported using wood pallets, with the remainder 
being made from other materials such as steel, plastic, or cardboard [Maloney 2000].  
 
By 2003, the U.S. pallet industry generated revenues of approximately $6 billion, and it was served by approximately 
3,600 companies, most of which were small, privately held entities. These companies were generally operating in 
only one location and serving customers within a limited geographic region. The industry was generally composed of 
companies that manufacture new pallets and companies that repair and recycle pallets. The U.S. Forest Service 
estimated that 475 million new wood pallets are produced annually, 300 million wood pallets were repaired and sent 
back into circulation, and 175 million wood pallets were sent to landfills [Bush and Araman 1998]. 
 
The pallet industry, a generally mature industry, had experienced significant changes during the 1990s. These 
changes were due, among other factors, to the focus by Fortune 1000 businesses on improving the efficiency of 
their supply chains, manufacturing, and distribution systems. This focus had caused many of these businesses to 
significantly the number of vendors serving them to simplify their procurement and product distribution processes. 
Palletized freight facilitated movement through the supply chain reduced costly loading and unloading delays at 
distribution centers. As a result, there had been an increased demand for high-quality pallets which decreased the 
cost per trip by reducing product damage during shipment and storage and by increasing the number of trips for 
which pallets can be used. Moreover, environmental and cost concerns had also accelerated the trend toward 
increased reuse or "recycling" of pallets and certain other transport packing materials, further emphasizing the 
importance of the quality of newly manufactured pallets. 
 
                                                     
1 The authors have prepared this case as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective 
handling of an administrative situation. It is not intended that statements herein be excerpted as fact outside of the class 
discussion. 
 
2 For access to the teaching note please email Sascha Vitzthum at sascha_vitzthum@bus.emory.edu 
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Shipping companies had a variety of options for procuring pallets. Traditionally, companies would buy the pallets, 
load the goods, and send them to their clients. Depending upon the size and make-up of the operations, businesses 
would decide whether to opt for single-use, lower-quality pallets that are not returned by the customers or for higher 
quality, reusable pallets, where the return processes would need to be arranged with the customers. The 
administrative, operational and logistical costs associated with managing the pallets, led to the emergence of third-
party providers that started to lease out high-quality pallets and offer management of the associated logistics. In the 
outsourced rental model, shippers paid a combination usage and transfer fees that usually amounted to total trip 
costs ($5-$8) that are below the purchase price of a one-way pallet ($10). 
 
By 2003, more than 10 percent of the 2 billion pallets that were in circulation in the U.S. were provided by pallet 
leasing or pooling companies. While the asset share in the overall market was fairly small, the pooling and leasing of 
the pallets was a highly profitable business. The major pallets pooling providers generated close to $2 billion in 
annual revenue and were expected to grow both their market share and revenue in the future. 
II. COMPETETIVE LANDSCAPE 
In the U.S., pallet pooling was a fairly novel business model with few national providers and some regional 
providers. By 2003, approximately 200 million pallets in circulation were multi-use rental pallets. In 1990 CHEP 
entered the U.S. market as the first provider with a national distribution network in the U.S.  Throughout the 
consolidation of the pallet industry in the 1990s a number of companies entered and exited the pallet pooling 
business. Between 1990 and 1996 companies such as First National Rental, Pallet Pallet and the Canadian Pallet 
council tried unsuccessfully to establish a pallet rental program in the U.S. The most common issue for the 
companies was the fairly small size of their pallet pool as well as low distribution center density, which increased the 
cost of shipping pallets. In 1997, PECO, a consortium of 12 pallet companies, was the first company to develop a 
rental system that could compete with CHEP’s. Focusing on the grocery industry, PECO management decided to 
work with only a few clients and a competitively small pallet pool of 2 million. The strategy worked, and by 1999 
PECO became the second largest rental provider in the U.S. Besides the two market leaders, only regional 
companies such as Kamps Pallets in Michigan were able to make the pallet pooling model work. Moreover, there 
were several attempts to introduce plastic pallet pooling models as a more environmentally friendly alternative to 
wooden pallets. However, the higher manufacturing costs and the resistance of industry organizations to adopt 
plastic pallets as a standard led to a quick demise of those efforts. 
 
By 2003, CHEP was the undisputed market leader in the U.S., at situation which mirrored the developments of most 
of the countries where CHEP operated in. Being the pioneer of the pallet pool-leasing model, CHEP was the market 
share leader in 90 percent of the 42 countries that it operated in. 
III. COMPANY BACKGROUND 
The Commonwealth Handling Equipment Pool (CHEP) evolved from the Allied Materials Handling Standing 
Committee, an organization developed by the Australian government to provide efficient handling of defense 
supplies during World War II. In 1949, the government decided to privatize the industry and mandated the sale of the 
CHEP organization. Among CHEP’s core assets were vast amounts of pallets, forklifts, and cranes left by the allied 
forces. 
 
Brambles, a company created in 1875, had significant experience in the materials handling industry, acquired CHEP 
in 1958. The acquisition of CHEP empowered Brambles with new core competencies making it ready to meet the 
constantly growing demands of the materials-handling industry. In particular, Brambles was interested in exploiting 
the large pool of pallets and containers, and taking advantage of the scale that this pool of platforms provided. 
Within a few years CHEP, leased out and operated the largest pool of pallets and containers in the southern 
hemisphere and the largest hiring fleet of forklift trucks in Australia. With the acquisition of the British firm GKN, 
CHEP set up a UK branch in 1974, followed by CHEP Canada in 1980, and CHEP USA in 1990. 
 
By 2003, CHEP was the global leader in pallet and plastic container pooling services, supporting many of the world’s 
largest companies. With its global headquarters located in Orlando, Florida, CHEP employed more than 7,500 
employees in 42 countries at more than 500 service centers. On a global scale, the company generated 
approximately $US 3 billion in revenue by pooling more than 200 million pallets and more than 40 million containers 
worldwide. In 2003, CHEP served more than 75,000 consumer good manufacturers and produce growers 
(manufacturers) and 225,000 wholesalers and retailers (distributors). 
IV. BUSINESS MODEL 
By issuing, collecting, conditioning, and reissuing pallets and containers from its service centers, CHEP supported 
manufacturers and growers to transport their products to distributors and retailers. Drawing from a pool of over 100 
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million pallets and containers, CHEP was only one of two pooling companies that distributed and collected its pallets 
across the entire U.S. Pallets accounted for nearly 90 percent of CHEP’s pooling business. 
 
CHEP leased high quality, standardized and easily identifiable (all CHEP pallets are painted blue) 48" by 40" pallets. 
The pallets were designed for multiple uses. Deploying high-quality softwood and reinforcing design, the pallets 
weighed 60 lbs. and could hold up to 2,800 lbs. of goods. In comparison, a standard pallet was 15 lbs. lighter and 
could only carry up to 1500 lbs. With an average of $20 of procurement cost, the CHEP pallets were also twice as 
expensive as the regular single-use pallets. By using CHEP’s pallets, clients had reduced transportation costs and 
reduced product damage due to more stable storage arrangements which would prevent weight shifts of the loaded 
goods. Moreover, softwood pallets were less likely to break when mishandled during transportation, loading and 
unloading. With higher payloads per pallet, transporters could improve vehicle utilization and provide faster 
turnaround times. Moreover, through the standardized design of the pallets, products could be unloaded faster and 
safer. In addition, the reusability of the CHEP pallets reduced disposal expenses at land fills. 
 
CHEP’s asset flow model was designed for closed-loop systems, where all supply-chain links are in a contractual 
relationship with CHEP. Initially, pallets were issued to manufacturers that could subsequently load goods onto the 
pallets. During this step, CHEP would charge the manufacturer an issue fee, which was related to the transport of 
the pallets from CHEP’s service centers to the manufacturer’s location, and a hire fee based on the days that the 
pallets were in the manufacturer’s possession. When the loaded pallets were shipped to the distributors, CHEP 
charged a transfer fee to the distributors. The distributors then had to pay a daily hire fee while they used the pallets 
and a recollection fee upon returning the pallets. Ideally, CHEP would collect all fees from the parties involved and 
receive all of its pallets at the service center, where pallets were sorted (A), refurbished if necessary (B), and 
reissued (C).3  
 
On average, a pallet trip through the closed loop took 44 days. It was estimated that CHEP charges a total of $5 to 
$6 in fees per pallet for an average trip.4 Since it charged a variety of variable and fixed fees from different clients, 
CHEP had tremendous administrative cost associated with billing the correct amount to each partner. Moreover, 
CHEP heavily depended on inventory reports by the clients (which are seldom verified) and random sampling to 
assess the correct fees.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Asset Flow and Pricing Model 
                                                     
3 The closed-loop asset flow is depicted in the shaded area of Figure 1. 
4 The financial data in this section were derived from public records and interviews with CHEP management. 
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In the original closed-loop model, CHEP had contract relations will all participating parties. In the past, CHEP had a 
fairly good record of tracking the pallets and billing the clients. However, with the rise of contracts and the growth in 
scale, pallets frequently were shipped outside of the network, making it impossible for CHEP to track pallets and 
enforce their return to the service centers. CHEP introduced several charges and penalties for its clients to limit 
pallets moving outside the closed-loop system. In 1998, it introduced surcharges ranging between $3.50 and $8.00 
for preferred manufacturers that would ship pallets to so called Non-Participating distributors (NPD), which had no 
contractual obligation to return pallets to CHEP. All non-preferred clients that could not return all pallets, because 
they were shipped outside of the CHEP network, were charged a “lost equipment fee” ranging from $20 to $24. 
However, it was CHEP’s burden to prove that (a) the pallets had actually left the closed loop, and (b) which party 
was responsible for the leakage and eventual loss of the pallets. 
 
By September 2002, CHEP reported that nearly 10 million pallets were leaked outside of the closed loop. About 3 
million pallets could be tracked to known NPDs that had no obligation to return the pallets to CHEP. The other 7 
million pallets were lost to out of network parties such as pallet recyclers or end-users who were hesitant to return 
the pallets or not aware that the blue pallets were rental property rather then part of the purchased goods. If CHEP 
could not collect those pallets, it would have to pay up to $21 per pallet for replacements or face losing annual 
revenue of $9 to $13 per pallet. 
 
As an initial response, CHEP collaborated with a substantial number of out-of-network parties as part of their Asset 
Recovery Program and raised the awards for returned pallets. Moreover, a budget of $20 million was set aside for 
activities to recover and collect lost pallets. However, trying to recover lost pallets was merely a short-term solution 
of the symptoms rather than a long-term cure of for lack of traceability of and accountability for the pallets. 
V. DISCOVERING THE POTENTIAL OF RFID 5 
In the mid 1990s, CHEP began to explore ways to improve asset tracking and customer service. At the time, the 
most common form of product identification was Universal Product Code (UPC), more commonly know as bar 
codes. Since their introduction in as a standard retail identifier in the mid 1970s, bar codes had risen to ubiquity. 
Virtually every product sold in the U.S. had a UPC symbol consisting of a human-readable 12-digit UPC number and 
a machine-readable bar code. The first six digits are a unique manufacturer identification number that is assigned by 
the Uniform Code Council (UCC). The next five digits were the product code that uniquely identifies product groups 
and packaging size. The last digit presented a check digit that verifies the integrity of the previous 11 digits. 
 
The bar codes enabled to major innovations in the retail industry. First, items could now be identified and associated 
with a through a unique 12-digit number. Second, and more importantly, the machine-readability enabled semi-
automated scanning, which improved the speed and accuracy of taking inventory or checking out at cash registers. 
The improved data quality also enabled retailers to analyze their sales and to track marketing efforts. 
 
Despite the ubiquity of UPC and the success of related analyses applications, there were many settings and 
circumstances where barcodes were simply not a feasible solution to identifying and tracking items. The scanning of 
barcodes usually required a person that would either hold the item in front of a scanner or alternatively point the 
scanner directly at the bar code. For a successful scan, a proper reading angle, a fairly short distance (max. 2 feet) 
and a line of sight were necessary. Moreover, only one item at a time could be scanned, which incurred large lead 
times for sizable inventories.   
 
For CHEP’s purpose of tracking millions of individual pallets, bar codes were inadequate because most stacked 
pallets were outside of the reading distance or hidden behind other pallets. Moreover, the labor required to scan 
individual pallets at different location was enormous. Looking for alternative tracking technologies, CHEP 
management soon took note of the formation of the Auto ID Center and joined it as one of its first sponsors. In 1998, 
the Uniform Code Council, Gillette and Procter & Gamble teamed up with MIT to create the Auto ID center. The 
mission of the Auto ID was do develop and deploy technologies that would replace the UPC bar code. The center 
soon focused on Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) as an appropriate technology for replacing bar codes. 
As a technology, RFID can be traced back to the 1930s. During the World War II, British planes would carry a 
transmitter, that when exited by radar waves, would broadcast a signal, identifying them as friendly aircrafts to the 
Allied radar station. RFID worked on the same basic concept: A tag, when exited by a radio wave sent by an 
external source, will reflect a slightly different signal back to the source. Based on the reflected signal, the source (or 
reader) can then identify tag.  
 
                                                     
5 This section draws from [Roberti 2004]. 
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A passive RFID tag could store 96 bit of information, allowing for a nearly infinite number of different Electronic 
Product Codes to be assigned. Thus, every tag and every associated item could be uniquely identified. In theory, a 
passive tag could be read from up to 10 feet away and no immediate line of sight was required for a successful read. 
More importantly, multiple tag readings were possible with a single scan. Thus, with the exception of water or metal 
blocking the radio waves, contents of entire warehouses could be read by simply walking or driving along the 
products, using a mobile reader. 
 
However, by 1999 the technology’s theoretical capabilities were not tested outside of a lab environment. Moreover, 
aside from prototypes, there were no commercial tags and readers available that would make a large scale 
implementation feasible. Thus, the CHEP management decided to become involved in the Auto ID imitative. CHEP 
agreed to provide the pallets fitted with RFID tags for potential field trials. The agreement was a big commitment, 
especially for a company that did not have experience with the emerging technology.  
 
At the time, the choice of auto-identification technology was relatively easy, since only one company provided tags 
that were powerful enough to be read through common dock doors. The first challenge was to attach the tag to the 
wooden pallets. Tags could not be attached underneath the pallet because glue would not properly adhere to the 
wood. The option of affixing the tags to the top of the pallet was soon discarded since the tags would be exposed to 
constant wear through loading and unloading. The possibility of placing the tag inside the wood was also not 
feasible, since the material would partially block the transmission of the RF signal. With the lack of technological 
alternatives, CHEP engineers decided to attach a plastic board to the pallets where tags could be attached. This 
design worked until the pallets were loaded with products containing water or metal that interfered with the proper 
transmission of the RFID signal. The only technically feasible solution, a two-tag solution, could be implemented but 
was too expensive for a large-scale rollout. 
 
Over the course of the next two years, the supply of RFID technology became abundant. Not satisfied with the 
outcome of the first prototype, CHEP started testing products from more then 30 technology vendors under various 
conditions. A team attached tags to different spots on the pallets and drove the pallets through a portal with 
readers.6 The team tested the tags in environmental chambers that brought the temperature down to -20 degrees 
Fahrenheit or up to 140 degrees. Moreover, they emulated real-world conditions by putting tagged pallets on a 
machine that simulated the vibration of trucks and by intentionally dropping containers to guarantee the performance 
of the RFID system in the field. In the end, an angled tag, attached to the center block of the pallet, proved to be 
best design. The design fulfilled the stringent reading requirements while at the same time minimizing exposure to 
damage. 7 
 
By 2001, CHEP’s RFID team had become expert in RFID implementation. EPCglobal, the successor of the Auto-ID 
center, adopted CHEP’s readability and testing requirements as the official standard. In addition, formal and informal 
links into the standard development community were established that helped CHEP to shape the future of the RFID 
technology. However, there were no immediate returns on investment from the RFID-related research. RFID was 
still not implemented to solve CHEP’s operational problems, and research expenses started to accumulate. By the 
end of 2001, the future of the project was in doubt. Fortunately, for the project, a new CEO was appointed in 
February 2002. Victor Mendes immediately saw the value of RFID, but he also was worried about the slow progress. 
He decided that the technology had to be implemented immediately instead of further testing it in controlled 
environments. 
The Pilot 
Donna Slyster, senior VP of operations, was put in charge of a team that included people from CHEP's IT, 
engineering, operations, and asset management departments. Having worked at EDS and General Motors, she was 
familiar with the implementation of new technologies. In order to have tight control over the pilot operations, Slyster 
decided to roll out the pilot close to the Florida headquarters. The team tagged 250,000 pallets with the aim of 
tracking them as they moved among 34 manufacturer locations and back to any of the six Florida service centers.  
 
The Florida pilot had three distinct objectives: to “pressure test” the technology in a real-world setting, to identify 
supply chain and pallet management benefits, and, most importantly, to provide evidence for future investment 
decisions in RFID. As Slyster reflects: 
We wanted to see if it was feasible to use RFID to track pallets through the supply chain. We 
wanted to understand the benefits we could achieve internally and for our customers. 
                                                     
6 The portal design is depicted in Figure 3 in Appendix III 
7 The final design is depicted in Figure 2 in Appendix III. 
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From a technology standpoint, CHEP already knew what to expect from RFID and how to fine-tune potential flaws. 
For instance, there were no products designed for mounting readers around dock doors, so CHEP engineers built a 
reader stand from pipe, fastened it to the doorway, and painted it yellow. Then they mounted four RF antennas to 
the pipe, two on each side. Cable was run from the antennas to a wall-mounted reader. Five dock doors, through 
which pallets enter the building, and two exit doors were fitted with this setup six distribution centers. In order to 
improve the durability of the tags, engineers also designed custom-made plastic cases that could withstand 
pressure, water, heat, and UV radiation. While this casing increases the cost of a single tag to $1, the life span of a 
tag now seemed infinite. 
 
Discovering supply-chain benefits was a more challenging task. In order to take advantage of real-time data feeds 
into the readers at different locations, the data needed to be transmitted to a networked architecture. Integration 
problems quickly arose. Several applications needed to be integrated to capture, organize, and analyze the RFID 
data. To capture the data, CHEP had to implement an edge application that would enable the control of all readers, 
tags, and antennas. Moreover, the data needed to be integrated with the backend systems and the EPC network, in 
order to be shared across the supply chain. Lastly, the data needed to be analyzed. CHEP used warehouse 
management software from two vendors to manage the data at the distributor and retail level [Verisign 2004]. The 
overwhelming amount of data, along with redundant reads, seriously burdened CHEP’s existing IT infrastructure. 
Thus, the pilot became a trigger for developing in-house software expertise as well as upgrading the IT 
infrastructure. CHEP invested $100 million in SAP enterprise resource-planning software and a state-of-the-art data 
center at its Orlando, Florida, headquarters, hoping that the infrastructure would enable the company to manage 
millions of small transactions each time a pallet is used, to collect the associated fees and to understand the 
complex movements of its assets. 
 
Pallet management was the most pressing problem facing CHEP. Nobody at CHEP really knew how the pallets 
were flowing through the supply chain. One pallet management objective was to simplify and optimize the asset 
flow. Slyster and Mendes created performance indicators that could be calculated with the data gathered through 
RFID and checked daily. In 2003, the performance indicators are part of CHEP’s robust monitoring and remote 
administration system, and in turn, this system was integrated with its existing legacy systems. Although Slyster 
would not exactly quantify the benefits for the pallet management operation, she contended that the results were 
convincing enough to launch a service offer for customers. For its RFID trial, CHEP only tracked the points of 
destinations for tagged pallets, which company returned the pallets, and whether they were damaged. Tracking the 
pallets originating from the 34 locations was a straightforward task, but as the system would expand and the amount 
of data mushrooms, the ability to capture, organize, and analyze the data would become important for CHEP and its 
customers. 
 
After five years of a sometimes frustrating process of trial and error, CHEP had perfected a way to put RFID tags on 
pallets and to ensure they can be read virtually 100 percent of the time. CHEP had worked with a RFID 
manufacturer and created a tag that could be embedded in plastic and bent around the center vertical support block 
in a pallet. The tag was well protected and could be read regardless of the pallet's orientation. CHEP had gained 
invaluable RFID knowledge about tags, readers and the IT infrastructure needed to support them. CHEP had 
shaped the industry standards for RFID deployment and a technology expertise than was unmatched both in the 
supply chain or retail industry. 
After the Pilot 
Following the pilot, Slyster was promoted to CIO, and CHEP’s RFID program was put under the leadership of Brian 
Beattie, SVP of Marketing. Puneet Sawhney was appointed as the Program Manager for RFID, and reported directly 
to Brian. The leadership team decided that for CHEP’s RFID program to succeed in the current environment, it had 
to be marketed to its supply-chain customers. Although the pilot was a technological success that helped CHEP to 
understand its own business processes on a small scale, there was no immediate return on the $20 million 
investment in the technological development. If Brian and Puneet could convince key accounts to adopt RFID and to 
build the network infrastructure, CHEP could trace the product-flow of its assets. Since the CHEP business model 
involved transfer of pallets when they are shipped from its service center to the manufacturers and then to the 
retailers, better information sharing would be a win-win situation for all the parties, leading to real-time asset 
management and control.  
 
Around June 2003, when CHEP concluded its pilot, a major event in the industry changed the pace of RFID 
adoption. Wal-Mart announced a January 2005 deadline for its top 100 suppliers to begin shipping on RFID-enabled 
pallets and cases. If widespread adoption is what makes any technology successful, then the Wal-Mart 
announcement would be the reason for RFID’s success in the retail supply chain. With an annual turnover of $260 
billion, Wal-Mart was the largest retailer in the world and is capable of setting the agenda for retail supply chains.  
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For retailers, key RFID features and the derived benefits of this technology made a compelling case. Through real-
time data capture, a finer granularity of information capture and accurate information-sharing processes could be 
automated that would lead to reduced labor and product-handling costs. Also, revenues could be increased through 
better inventory management and the reduction of out-of-stock losses. However, despite theoretical benefits, the 
reactions of both suppliers and retailers to the new technology proved difficult to gauge.  
VI. MOVING FORWARD 
After reviewing their clients’ current initiatives, Brian and Puneet were convinced that they had a solution that would 
address both their clients’ needs and the improvement of internal operations. If the main fears of the manufacturers 
were cost and lack of expertise with the technology, CHEP could provide an economical solution for the pallet 
tagging. Instead of affixing a new tag to cases every time an order is shipped, it would simply read the code of 
CHEP’s pallet, which then could be associated with the loaded products. In that scenario, the manufacturers would 
save on variable costs and would have a small, fixed-cost investment in the readers and the connection to the back-
end systems. Renting the RFID-enabled pallets would be slightly more expensive, but the client's net costs would be 
far less than the expense of developing their own RFID solution. 
 
The Wal-Mart compliance requirements of the client were well aligned with the new “PLUS ID” Service. For a 
surcharge of US$ 0.49 per pallet trip, clients would receive RFID-enabled pallets. With the PLUS ID program, clients 
would not have to worry about installing the technology. Similar to the pallets themselves, the clients would rent a 
high-quality technology that simply worked. Moreover, the PLUS ID tags would be rewriteable, enabling the clients to 
store information about the products loaded onto the pallet. By taking advantage of PLUS ID, clients would be able 
to improve their supply chain administration and improve their product management.  
 
It was a story similar to that of Electronic Data Interchange and bar codes of the prior decade. The manufacturers 
needed to comply with the requirements of the retailer community. However, the uneven pace of the standards 
adoption forced compliance of only a limited number of their larger customers, a circumstance that demanded their 
investment in infrastructure. For their part, Wal-Mart, Target, and Albertsons were open to the standards and 
practices issues and seemed to accommodate to standards and processes that served both sides of the exchange. 
With the PLUS ID service on the horizon, CHEP seemed poised to offer its clients—both manufacturers and 
retailers—an effective approach toward aligning the strategies of the entire supply chain. 
 
Despite the potential for higher supply chain visibility and better data analysis in the future, both manufacturers and 
distributors were hesitant to adopt the PLUS ID service. 8 Given the uncertainty in the development of the technology 
and the final requirements of the Wal-Mart mandate, the clients tried to minimize their initial technology investment. 
The most common approach to deal with the Wal-Mart mandate was to simply attach single-use RFID tags to the 
cases and ship them to Wal-Mart. The “slap-and-ship” approach, as it was called in the industry, did not require 
building a reader infrastructure, which could cost up to $10.000 per portal, or integrating new middleware. The 
information on the tags would never be read by the manufacturers. The manufacturers did not want to invest into 
systems infrastructure until industry-wide standards for the technology were set.  
 
While the CHEP solution was state of the art, a difference of 49 cents per pallet trip, which corresponds to an 8 to 10 
percent price increase to the cost of a regular pallet trip, was significant to suppliers that already had lower margins 
than their peers that did not deal with the large retail chains [Riper 2007]. Convincing manufacturers to buy a service 
that promised future benefits but no immediate efficiency gains would be a hard sale to make. Moreover, the clients 
argued that CHEP only wanted to recoup its initial technology investment at their expense while, at the same time, 
reaping the benefits of the internal process improvements. CHEP, on the other hand, argued that the services would 
only work if all the pallets were equipped with RFID, making the investment necessary.  
 
CHEP’s RFID team faced a classical chicken-and-egg problem: CHEP could only realize the potential of RFID tags if 
it generated enough critical mass, both in terms of customers and revenue, to equip fully all pallets. However, clients 
were not able to make investments before the technology was proven, the infrastructure was in place or before the 
benefits of the system could be realized. Beattie knew that the PLUS ID Service would only be the beginning of a 
variety of value-added services as long as he could convince a few customers to carry the burden of the 
infrastructure investment. Was it really too far-fetched trying to transform the company known for providing blue 
pallets into a trusted logistics partner that adds value across the supply chain as a whole? 
                                                     
8 See “General Products” in Appendix II for an exemplary manufacturer’s take on RFID. 
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CASE QUESTIONS 
1. What are the costs associated with the loss and underutilization of the pallets?  
2. Why would CHEP choose RFID technology to improve its operations? 
3. What RFID-enabled business services should CHEP offer in the future? Can CHEP create value that 
transcends its traditional value chain? 
4. Should CHEP focus on its core business or should it utilize its technology expertise to become a supply 
chain information provider? 
APPENDIX I. STAKEHOLDERS ATTITUDE TOWARD RFID ADOPTION 
Value-Rite 
As one of the major retailers in the U.S., Value-Rite had revenue of $30 billion in 2003. It was looked on as an 
innovator in the retail industry. With clean stores, wide aisles, and many choices, this chain still attracted a wide 
variety of customers. To achieve its goal of low costs and best prices, Value-Rite had to constantly reengineer its 
supply chain.  
 
Over the last five years, Value-Rite had grown at an impressive rate of 15 percent annually. It had aggressively 
challenged the competition in major markets, driving both top-line and bottom-line growth. With a major focus on 
network expansion and cost reduction, its management realized that it will have to depend heavily on the latest 
developments in information technology.  
 
Value-Rite’s management felt that RFID would be a key enabler for removing redundant costs from the supply chain. 
Its CIO, Tilda Limman, was excited about the benefits of this technology. She stressed that RFID will help Value-Rite 
serve its customers much better: 
When you shop at Value-Rite on a Saturday afternoon, there's a pretty good chance many items 
aren't on the shelf anymore. Associates do their best restocking items, which is one of our biggest 
challenges. We know when inventory comes into the building. We don't know exactly where and 
when it needs to go from the backroom to the shelf. We have looked at this 100 times in the last 10 
years. All the technology we reviewed would put restrictions on our ability to move products around 
the store and out to the customers. We know the quantity, but don't have a clue where the 
merchandise is. If anyone has been in the back room of a major retailer at Christmas, finding 
product can be a daunting task. That really was the killer application. And we don't have to have 100 
percent reads. If I miss the read to the floor, I get it coming back from the floor and then to the 
compactor. 
 
While the benefits of this technology were apparent, there were also many challenges associated with its 
implementation. The biggest challenge was the lack of uniform technology standards that would enable faster 
adoption at reduced cost. In order to facilitate the establishment of such standards,  Value-Rite, had sponsored 
EPCglobal and was closely monitoring its current developments. 
 
As a large retailer, Value-Rite did not want its suppliers to perceive that the implementation of RFID will increase its 
costs without any tangible return. Interestingly, when Value-Rite planned the business case, it believed that the 
technology would work with cases and pallets and that it could justify investing in RFID. Says Tilda,  
It felt similar to what happened with barcodes. In the 1980s, somebody had to take a brave step. It 
was a chance to see if we could bring some companies along with us. Therefore, the biggest 
challenge is to communicate effectively to its suppliers, so that they have clarity on what Value-Rite 
is expecting from them. With RFID, the biggest challenge is communication—trying to keep our 
suppliers less confused based on whose article they read last. You have no idea how much time 
that consumes. They're calling every week, nearly every day. I spend a lot of time talking with 
suppliers. 
 
While Value-Rite feels that there are obvious benefits for all its suppliers, it is sensitive to the investments that these 
companies have to make in tags and reading equipment. Therefore, it has collaborated with other key retailers to 
implement a phased geographical rollout beginning January 2005, starting with the Dallas market. 
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After she signed he capital expenditure for the RFID related investment for the Dallas distribution center, Tilda asked 
herself, “I know this one's not going to fail. But will it play out how we've envisioned it?” 
General Products 
General Products Inc. was one of the largest cereal and packaged food manufacturers in the world. Headquartered 
in Chicago, IL, it had business interests all over the world. With 12 production sites and 13 regional distribution 
centers, General Products had a $60 billion yearly turnover. 
 
General Products had played a key role in RFID adoption in the retail supply chain and had participated in the Auto 
ID Center’s field test, as well as other industry sponsored RFID pilots. It believed that RFID will have considerable 
impact in reducing the inventory costs throughout the supply chain.  
 
Over the years, General Products has supported many industry-wide initiatives, such as EDI (Electronic Data 
Interchange), VMI (Vendor Managed Inventory), and CPFR (Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and 
Replenishment). While all these initiatives required a significant time commitment, few of them actually delivered the 
benefits that they promised. With this discrepancy in mind, General Products supported the RFID efforts of its key 
retailers with cautious optimism, especially since it required large capital investments before any returns could be 
expected.  
 
With its key retail customers driving toward “everyday low prices,” there was tremendous pressure on General 
Products to reduce its costs. Any increase in packaging costs (since they are now required to put RFID tags at the 
pallet and case level) would not be sustainable unless a clear ROI is proved. 
 
To limit its risk and to ensure that existing operational processes had minimal disruption, General Products adopted 
the “slap-and-ship” approach. However, the retailers argue that using this method would prevent companies from 
integrating RFID technology into their business processes, thereby limiting any returns on the RFID investment.  
 
Mark Gumm, senior director of IT, says that General Products used “slap-and-ship” because it let the company learn 
about and experiment with the technology. “We prefer to call it ‘tag-at-ship’ not ‘slap-and-ship’, because it has 
proven to be a very successful process," Mark said about the method, which had a 96 percent success rate for case 
reads at General Products. 
 
“It's unclear what General Products’ ROI will be after RFID implementation,” Mark says. He also worried about 
application and tag cost, which was still between 20 and 60 cents per tag. "Equipment purchases could become 
obsolete and we are still lacking automation and high-speed encoding," Mark said about other RFID challenges. 
 
According to Mark, only 30 percent of General Products’ total volume goes to retailers that mandated RFID at the 
case and pallet level. Unless more retailers announced similar mandates, it would be expensive for General 
Products to incorporate RFID tagging into its manufacturing and operations processes.  
 
General Products, like other key suppliers, viewed the RFID mandates as the beginning of industry-wide 
experimentation. With the current read rates less than 100 percent, this technology was not deemed dependable 
enough for commercial transactions. Reflecting on the future of RFID Mark says: 
We currently look at this initiative as a mere cost of doing business with the key retailers. If they 
want the mandates to be successful, the retailers need to share the costs as well as the benefits 
that they will get in their supply chain. Unless that happens, this would be looked as another arm 
twisting exercise by the mega retailers, and RFID will die a slow death. 
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APPENDIX II. SELECTED FINANCIAL DATA 
CHEP AMERICA (in million USD) 2006 2005 2004 2003  
Sales Revenue 2956.4 2762.6 2440 2048  
Operating Profit  703.8 534.4 393.6 318.5  
      
CHEP AMERICA SALES by service 
 (in million USD) 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Pallets 2571.7 2376.2 2122.8 1761.3 1485.0 
RPC 177.4 165.8 146.4 122.9 104.8 
Automotive 147.8 138.2 97.6 81.9 69.9 
Other 59.1 82.9 73.2 81.9 87.4 
Total 2956 2763 2440 2048 1747 
      
CHEP AMERICA SALES by Region  
(in million USD) 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Americas 1330.2 1188.1 1073.6 962.6 856.0 
Europe 1241.5 1215.7 1073.6 880.6 716.3 
Rest of World 384.3 359.2 292.8 204.8 174.7 
Total 2956 2763 2440 2048 1747 
      
CHEP USA  2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Size of Pallet Pool (in million) 93 87 84 80 70 
ROCI (annualized ) 25% 16% 10% 9% 10% 
      
CHEP AMERICA USA CANADA 
Latin 
America   
Sales Distribution 80% 10% 10%   
Source: Brambles 2007 
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APPENDIX III. PICTORIALS OF RFID INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
Figure 2. Application of RFID Tag to the Center Block of a Pallet 
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Figure 3. Reader Portal 
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PART B: CHEP: TRACKING THE PROGRESS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
By the end of 2003, CHEP made the decision to proceed with its RFID development. While a pool of RFID-enabled 
pallets would bring benefits both to their internal operations and to their customers, it was clear that further 
investment would have to come from outside of CHEP.  With the initial deadline of January 2005 fast approaching, 
there was hope that that the Wal-Mart mandate would increase demand for the RFID-enabled pallets, tagging the 
complete pallet pool as a by product of the retail giant’s pressure. At the same time, Beattie and Sawhney 
understood that they would have to quantify the both the network and the individual benefits for CHEP’s customers 
in order to receive the infrastructure investments and to secure long-term contracts for the RFID-enabled pallets. 
II. EXTENDED PILOTS 
In order to better communicate the benefits of RFID in the supply chain, Sawhney decided to conduct broader 
research on RFID studies and to set up use cases with selected partners. First he gathered information on key 
benefits from previous studies. A study conducted by IBM showed that an RFID-enabled supply chain could lead to 
7- 20 percent increase in labor efficiency. Studies by the Auto ID center found similar results in efficiency (3-12  
percent), and also concluded that inventory cost of losses, maintenance and item returns could be reduced in the 10 
and 20 percent range. While those numbers where promising indicators, the CHEP team realized that they would 
have to show that their own technological solution could provide similar, if not better, results for its clients. Thus, a 
new pilot study that reached across different supply chain links was designed. 
 
Having learned from the experiences of the internal pilot the team decided on a different set up for the pilot in late 
2004. First, they decided that this time around selected partners would have to partake in the pilot to share the costs 
as well as to increase the credibility of the project. Specifically two major manufacturers and a large retail chain in 
the Brazilian market decided to support the project. Moreover, the experiment was significantly narrower in scope 
and smaller in size, with only 1000 tagged pallet moving between the 13 distribution centers of CHEP, the 
manufacturers and the distributor. 
 
Focusing mainly on the areas of shipping and receiving and information interchange, the two month pilot provided 
valuable lessons and performance indicators. Most importantly, an estimate on the Return on investment (ROI) 
could be made: For high priced retail items such as perfumes or razors a positive ROI could be expected in the third 
year of operation whereas low margin dry goods would not yield a positive ROI until the ninth year of RFID-enabled 
operation.  Moreover, the experiment convinced both manufacturers to enter into long-term contracts with CHEP 
USA by 2006, both sharing the cost of the tagging and paying premium prices for the use of 10,000 RFID-enabled 
pallets per month.  
III. WAL-MART RFID MANDATE AND COLLABORATION 
Equipped with the positive results and the announcement of the two manufactures the CHEP team was confident 
that more customers would agree to use RFID-enabled CHEP pallets. However, Wal-Mart delayed the deadline for 
its mandate several times, reducing the pressure on its suppliers to adopt RFID-enabled solutions. Moreover, after 
experimenting in their five Texas distribution centers for several years, Wal-Mart recognized in late 2006 that for 
their purposes the RFID enablement of the stores should take priority over the use within the whole supply chain. An 
executive stated that out of stock products had already dropped by 30 percent and the efficiency of moving products 
from the backroom to shelf had increased by 60 percent. Thus the focus on the RFID mandate shifted from 
delivering store information to the suppliers rather then optimizing the supply chain. 
 
Despite the setbacks, CHEP further intensified its collaboration with Wal-Mart. In 2007, CHEP agreed to provide its 
pallets free of charge to Wal-Mart, as an attempt to convince affiliated manufacturers to use (and pay for) CHEP 
pallets. [Burke 2007]. Further, CHEP became an integral part of Wal-Mart’s green packaging initiative, an effort to 
reduce waste associated with the packaging process. Wal-Mart, promoted the CHEP pooling model as the most 
environmentally friendly packaging alternative [Brindley and Harrison 2007]. 
IV. INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 
The success of CHEP’s pooling model did not go unnoticed. Several competitors created businesses models that 
where strikingly similar to CHEP. While companies such as IGPS where unable to compete with both the size and 
the network density of CHEP’s pallet pool, they would challenge CHEP with new innovative products and services. 
IGPS, developed a plastic pallet that was 30 percent lighter and was projected to last 10 to 20 years longer than 
CHEP’s wooden counterpart [Lacefield 2007]. Being led by a former CHEP executive and having a smaller pallet 
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pool, IGPS had the foresight to equip all pallets with four RFID tags. Yet, only in late 2006 IGPS announced pilots to 
test the technology, lagging behind CHEP by nearly three years. Also, with a price point of over USD 60 per pallet, 
IGPS was hard fought to steadily increase its pallet pool to realize economize of scales and network effects. 
 
CHEP reacted to the new competition by further innovating RFID technologies and by expanding the PLUS ID 
service beyond the wooden pallets. Realizing that its clients would be slow to adopt into RDID reader infrastructure,  
CHEP decided to accommodate older reader technologies that were already in place at most facilities. The result 
was the 3-in-1 tag that was readable by RFID readers, barcode scanners and, last but not least the human eye. The 
multi-mode readability enabled tracking across the entire supply chain, as long as the data was fed back into the 
information system. In addition, the new tags were also rewritable, allowing customers to store specific information, 
such as shipping date, or destination aside from the predetermined “license tag numbers” assigned by CHEP [CHEP 
2006].  
V. LOOKING AHEAD 
By 2007, selected clients had opted in to the Plus ID program. RFID pallets were shipped on an on demand basis, to 
customers that had agreed to pay the PLUS ID surcharge. While no exact numbers were published, it was estimated 
that every month between 10,000 and 20,000 RFID-enabled pallets were issued from the CHEP service center. 
While this was only a small portion of the pallet pool, it allowed CHEP to continuously tag new pallets, an effort that 
essentially was paid for by the PLUS ID revenues. It would be a long way to tagging all of CHEP’s pallets but the 
experiences from the pallet business were invaluable for the other lines of business. 
 
CHEP aggressively moved into new customer segments. In late 2006 CHEP started to tag its plastic containers 
[RFID Update 2006]. Tagging its plastic containers with RFID technology enabled CHEP to further expand its 
pooling model to the automotive, beverage, and raw materials industries. Furthermore, CHEP also started to 
markets services related to the expertise gathered in the pilot studies. Named Supply Chain Consulting, a group of 
technology and supply chain experts offered their services to clients and external customers. 
 
In the beginning of 2007 Beattie and Sawhney looked back at the last five years and realized how far they had 
come. The RFID related innovation had helped CHEP maintain market leadership in the pallet business, while at the 
same time fostering CHEP’s reputation as one of the most innovative companies in the supply chain business. 
Moreover, the spill-over effects into other industry segments and the creation of new services were seen as a good 
signs to manifest CHEP as a key player in the logistics industry.  Although they not achieve the initial goal of tagging 
the complete pallet pool and having the all of its customers equipped with RFID infrastructure and corresponding 
data management software, they still saw a bright future for CHEP and its RFID-related business. 
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